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In this paper, we carry on with the analysis of constructible concepts initiated in
[M. Freund, On the notion of concept 1. Artiﬁcial Intelligence 172 (2008) 570–590], and
examine the key notions of categorization theory that are linked with category-based
induction. In the main part of the article, we propose a reformulation of classical prototype
theory using the framework of monotonic and non-monotonic logics. In this perspective,
the classical notions of essence and intension are respectively interpreted as sets of necessary
and defeasible consequences, giving rise to a relation  analogous to that of classical
consequence, and a relation ∼ which behaves, relatively to , like a supraclassical rational
inference relation. This formal analogy between the language of categorization theory and
that of propositional logic reveals itself to be particularly useful when dealing with the
problem of category-based induction.
© 2008 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
In [4], we proposed a model well adapted to the study of a speciﬁc class of concepts which we called constructible.
Constructible concepts can be recursively deﬁned from their associated deﬁning feature set, following a mechanism similar to
that of a dictionary or an encyclopedia. The notions of membership and typicality are then given a precise meaning in terms
of deﬁning and characteristic features. In this qualitative approach, which departs from the classical representations based
on numerical gradation functions, membership is taken care of through a membership function ϕ f with values in a ﬁnite
abstract and totally ordered set, while typicality becomes a simple comparative preorder among objects. Both membership
and typicality can be extended to compound concepts, and the compositionality of these notions has been the subject of a
speciﬁc study.
In the present paper, we use this formalism to redeﬁne and study important notions that are classically linked with
categorization and prototype theory. For this purpose, we reinterpret the notions of membership and typicality in a dy-
namical perspective: any feature that can be seen as a necessary attribute applying to all instances of a given concept f
is considered as a consequence of f , necessarily induced by this concept. By analogy with the semantics of propositional
calculus, we therefore write f  g whenever g applies to all instances of f . Similarly, a feature that applies to all typical
instances of f is considered as typically induced by f , and we use the symbol ∼ to denote this inference relation: thus we
have f ∼ g if g applies to all typical instances of f . For instance, to-have-a-beak, to-be-oviparous and to-have-feathers are
necessary consequences of the concept to-be-a-bird, while to-ﬂy, or to-sing are typically but not necessarily induced by this
concept. In the language constituted by the set of concepts F equipped with the determination connective , the relation 
behaves like a monotonic inference relation. As for the relation ∼, it is very close to the rational inference relations deﬁned
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inference relations reveals itself to be particularly useful in addressing problems like those of stereotypical features inheri-
tance or category-based induction: we shall see indeed that some experimental results can now receive a purely theoretical
proof. This shows that the model primarily proposed to account for the basic notions of membership and typicality for
constructible concepts is also valid for the study of more sophisticated properties, and that it can be used as a general tool
for a better understanding of this class of concepts.
Plan of this paper
In order to make this paper self-contained, we recall in Section 2 the basic notions that underlie the theory of con-
structible concepts. In particular, we provide an explicit construction of the membership and typicality orders associated
with elementary concepts, and, after introducing the determination connective, we extend these notions to the case of com-
pound concepts. In Section 3, we reinterpret the notions of concept extension and intension in the framework of inference
relations. We show that typical induction satisﬁes most of the properties that characterize the rational inference relations.
Section 4 is a brief survey of the problem of inheritance for stereotypical features, for which a simple solution is proposed
via the property of Rational Monotony. In Section 5, we examine questions linked with category-based induction. We ﬁrst in-
vestigate the problem of typical induction, in which properties valid for a typical subcategory can be extended to the whole
category. For this purpose, we introduce the notion of non-speciﬁc features, which formalizes that of blank predicates used
in cognitive psychology experiments. We then turn to a different kind of induction that is based on a notion of similarity.
There, a property that is satisﬁed for a given class of objects translates to a neighboring class. In order to better analyze this
problem, we also reinterpret in our framework the notion of resemblance, and propose to model it through a resemblance
order that parallels the corresponding notions for membership and typicality. This leads to an interesting result concerning
similarity-based induction. We conclude in Section 6.
2. Membership and typicality
We brieﬂy recall in this section the basic notions developed in [4]. The starting point of the theory of constructible
concepts is the distinction between sharp and vague concepts. Sharp concepts are simple ‘undeﬁnable’ concepts, for which,
contrary to vague concepts, membership is an all or not matter: if f is a sharp concept and x is an arbitrary object, the
proposition f applies to x is either true or false, with no intermediate values. Such is not the case for vague concepts,
for which membership becomes a graded magnitude. Vague concepts are usually learnt and understood with the help of
several simpler concepts. They are thus present in an agent’s mind together with a ﬁnite set Δ f of deﬁning features, which
is considered as simpler, or less complex, than f . To make this notion precise, we recursively deﬁne the complexity level
of a concept in the following way: at level 0 we rank the sharp concepts that are part of the agent’s knowledge. Given an
arbitrary integer n > 0, we then rank at level n the vague concepts that are not ranked at a lower level, and whose deﬁning
features are of complexity less than n. The set F of constructible concepts gathers, in a given context, all the elementary
concepts that can be attributed such a complexity level. Constructible concepts can be therefore considered as the outputs
of a dictionary, whose inputs would consist of deﬁning feature sets. There may exist other kinds of concepts in the agent’s
world representation: these will remain ignored by the present theory, which is only meant to deal with constructible
concepts.
2.1. Membership orders and membership functions
Together with F , we suppose given a set of objects, real or ﬁctive, which we denote by O, and we recursively associate
with each concept f of F a strict partial membership order ≺μf on O that compares the relative f -membership of the
objects at hand. This order takes into account the respective salience of the elements of Δ f as well as the membership
functions they generate. More precisely, let f be a concept of complexity n, and suppose that, for all concepts k of com-
plexity less than n, we have deﬁned a preorder μk on O, together with an associated membership function ϕk with values
in a totally ordered ﬁnite set (Ak,<k). The membership order induced by f is then deﬁned as follows:
Deﬁnition 1. Given two objects x and y, we say that x falls at most as much as y under the concept f , written x μf y,
if, for any concept h of Δ f such that ϕh(y) <h ϕh(x), there exists a concept k of Δ f , k more salient than h, such that
ϕk(x) <k ϕk(y).
The relation μf thus deﬁned is a quasi order and yields the strict partial order ≺μf . An object x is said to fall under f
(equivalently, f is said to apply to x) if x is ≺μf -maximal. Thus, x falls under f if and only if x falls under all the deﬁning
features of f . The set of objects falling under f is the extension of f , and is denoted by Ext f . This set is also referred to as
the category corresponding to the concept f .
The membership distance μ f (x) of an object x to Ext f is the length of a maximal chain x≺μf x1 ≺μf x2 ≺μf · · · ≺μf xn , with
last term xn ∈ Ext f . This distance satisﬁes μ f (x) = 0 if and only if x falls under f . The functional equivalence induced by μ
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‘ϕ f (x) f ϕ f (y) if μ f (x)μ f (y)’. The function ϕ f , the membership function of f , provides a qualitative evaluation of the
f -membership of objects at hand, and satisﬁes ϕ f (x) < f ϕ f (y) whenever x≺μf y.
It is possible to derive from μ f a quantitative membership degree δ
μ
f that takes its value in a ﬁnite subset of the interval
[0,1]: this can be done by simply setting δμf = 1− μ f /Nμf , where Nμf , the width of f , is the maximal membership distance
between an object x and Ext f . It is not diﬃcult to see that this width is directly related to the number of values taken by
the gradation function δμf , and that one has N
μ
f = |δμf (O)| − 1.
It has to be emphasized that the use of membership degrees is only accessory in the theory of constructible concepts,
where membership is ﬁrst considered as a comparison tool: given two objects, it is usually suﬃcient to dispose of a tool
that enables to decide which, if any, ‘falls more’ under a given vague concept, without necessarily assigning a precise—and
most often meaningless—numerical value.
2.2. Typicality
Similarly to membership, typicality relative to a constructible concept f is no more considered as a measurable magni-
tude, but rather as an order relation among the elements of the set Ext f . The notion of greater or less typicality among
the exemplars of an elementary concept rests on the (ﬁnite) characteristic feature set of this concept. These features help
the agent understanding or illustrating the concept at hand; they are used to distinguish it from neighboring concepts, and
indicate the attributes that are generally expected from the exemplars of f . For instance, if f is the concept to-be-a-bird,
the associated characteristic set χ f may include the concepts to-ﬂy, to-sing, to-live-in-the-trees. It may also include attributes
that are related to the average size, the shape or the weight of the concept exemplars, like to-be-small or to-be-light. On the
contrary, concepts like to-have-feathers and to-have-wings, which apply to all instances of f , cannot be part of the character-
istic feature set, but they may ﬁgure in the deﬁning feature set Δ f : in the remainder of the paper, given a vague concept f ,
we shall suppose that χ f and Δ f are disjoint sets. We shall refer to the elements of Δ f ∪χ f as to the stereotypical features
of f , and denote this set by Σ f .
In the general case, as is done for the deﬁning feature set, the agent also endows the characteristic set with a partial
salience order, which is meant to compare the relative importance of the different characteristic features. It is this ordered
set that we use as a basis for the construction of the ‘typicality order’ (in fact, a preorder):
Deﬁnition 2. (See [4], Defn. 6.) Given an elementary concept f and two exemplars x and y of f , x is said to be at most as
f -typical as y, written xτf y, if for any concept h of χ f such that ϕh(y) <h ϕh(x), there exists a concept k of χ f , k more
salient than h, such that ϕk(x) <k ϕk(y).
The relation τf is reﬂexive and transitive, and is therefore a partial preorder on Ext f . In the simple case where the
salience order on χ f is empty, we have xτf y if and only if ∀g ∈ χ f , ϕg(x)g ϕg(y), that is if and only if no characteristic
feature of f applies more to x than to y.
The typical instances of f are the τf -maximal elements of Ext f . Denoting by Typ f the set of these elements, one has
Typ f = Ext f ∩⋂g∈χ f Ext g: an object is f -typical if and only if it falls under f and under all its characteristic features.1
One has x≺τf y for all elements x and y of Ext f such that x /∈ Typ f and y ∈ Typ f . Note that Typ f =
⋂
g∈Σ f Ext g .
If k is a subconcept of f , that is, a concept such that μ f μk , its typical elements may be atypical for f : for instance,
a typical ostrich is not a typical bird. In general, there exists no relation between Typk and Typ f . In the exceptional case
where Typk is a subset of Typ f , we say that k is smooth in f ([4], Section 6): thus to-be-a-ﬂying-bird is a smooth subconcept
of to-be-a-bird, because typical ﬂying-birds are typical birds.
In a way formally similar to what was done for the construction of the membership degree function δμf , a typicality
degree δτf (x) may be deﬁned for all elements x of Ext f (see [4], Remark 3). This normalized gradation function may be
considered as a useful shortcut to account for a non-measurable magnitude. It satisﬁes δτf (x) < δ
τ
f (y) whenever x≺τf y, and
δτf (x) = 1 if and only if x is f -typical.
2.3. The case of compound concepts
Elementary concepts may give raise to compound concepts through different combinations. The simplest one is the or-
dinary conjunction, &, which corresponds to a simple juxtaposition of concepts, like in (to-be-green)&(to-be-light). However,
we have chosen to introduce and study a more sophisticated connective called the determination operator, which we denote
by  (see [4], Section 4). This partial operator yields a compound concept g  f in which the modiﬁer g plays an auxiliary
role compared to that of the noun-concept f , as in the example of a-ﬂying-bird, a-green-apple or a-marine-mammal. When
1 This equality requires that the left-hand side is a nonempty set: we suppose that this is always the case for elementary concepts.
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through the help of an associated set of deﬁning or characteristic features. Thus, the membership and the typicality or-
ders associated with compound concepts cannot be directly deﬁned, except for some special cases. In [4], we proposed the
following deﬁnition:
• Let f be a g-determinable concept, μf and μg the membership orders associated with f and g . The membership
order μg f associated with g  f is deﬁned by:
xμg f y if x
μ
f y and either x≺μf y, or xμg y.
The set of ≺μg f -maximal elements is the extension Ext(g  f ) of the compound concept g  f . It satisﬁes Ext(g  f ) =
Ext g ∩ Ext f .
• Let f be a g-determinable concept, τf and τg the typicality orders associated with f and g . The typicality order τg f
induced on Ext(g  f ) by g  f is deﬁned by:
xτg f y if xτf y and either x≺τf y, or xτg y.
Priority in membership and typicality is thus given to the principal concept f : roughly speaking, we distinguish between
an apple that is typically red and a typical red-apple. The set of ≺τg f -maximal elements is denoted by Typ(g  f ). These
elements are considered as typical relatively to the concept g  f . Contrary to membership, typicality is not compositional,
and there generally exists no relation between the sets Typ(g  f ), Typ f and Typ g . We shall however mention two important
exceptions:
• Typ(g  f ) ⊆ Typ f whenever Typ f ∩ Ext g 
= ∅ ([4], Proposition 12).
• Typ(g  f ) = Typ g ∩ Typ f whenever Typ g ∩ Typ f 
= ∅ ([4], Proposition 13).
The ﬁrst case occurs when there exist typical instances of f that fall under g . Then, g is said to be non-exceptional for f ,
and the typical exemplars of g  f are then chosen among the typical exemplars of f : for example, since there exists typical
birds with webbed feet, typical exemplars of birds-with-webbed-feet will be typical as birds. In the second case, where we
know that some of the typical instances of f are also typical relative to g , the typical instances of the compound concept
are simply those that are both typical for f and for g: typical black olives are typical olives that are typically black.
2.4. Essence and Intension
It is useful to recall the deﬁnitions of Essence and Intension that were reintroduced in [4]: the essence of a concept f is
the set of all concepts g that apply to every exemplar of f : that is, g ∈ Ess f if and only if Ext f ⊆ Ext g . This set gathers the
common features which are shared by all the instances of f . We have Ext f =⋂g∈Ess f Ext g . Similarly, Int f , the intension of
f , is the set of features that are shared by all typical instances of f : Int f = {g: Typ f ⊆ Ext g}. For instance, to-ﬂy is in the
intension of to-be-a-bird, because all typical birds ﬂy. The elements of Int f will be referred to as the typical features of f .
When f is an elementary concept, the set Typ f can be retrieved from Int f through the equality Typ f =⋂g∈Int f Ext g: an
object is therefore f -typical if and only if it falls under every typical feature of f . This equality has to be replaced by the
simple inclusion Typ f ⊆⋂g∈Int f Ext g in the case where f is a compound concept.
Two concepts f and g will be considered as equivalent if they have same extension and same typical associated elements.
This will be denoted by f ≡ g . Thus, f ≡ g if and only if Ext f = Ext g and Typ f = Typ g .
We shall now reinterpret the notions of Essence and Intension in the framework of inference relations, considering Ess f
and Int f as sets of strong or weak consequences of f .
3. Necessary and typical induction
In this section, we show how the basic notions of membership and typicality can be reinterpreted in the framework of
inference relations, and how it is possible to use the tools of non-monotonic logics in categorization theory.
Let f be a concept and g an element of Ess f ; then g can be seen as a necessary feature of f , in the sense that g
necessarily applies to all objects to which f applies. Thus, f cannot be ‘true’ on an object without g being ‘true’ at the
same time. By analogy with the semantics of propositional calculus, we consider g as a consequence of f , and write f  g .
For instance, each of the concepts to-have-a-beak, to-have-feathers and to-be-oviparous may be considered as a consequence
of the concept to-be-a-bird: if something is a bird, then it is necessarily oviparous, and it has necessarily beak and feathers.
The relation  deﬁned by: f  g iff g ∈ Ess f (or, equivalently, f  g iff Ext f ⊆ Ext g) is clearly reﬂexive and
transitive. It is immediate that it is also monotonic with respect to the determination connective : if f  g , then
h  f  g and f  k  g for all concepts h and k for which these expressions are meaningful, because of the equalities
Ext(h  f ) = Ext( f  h) = Ext f ∩ Ext h. We shall refer to  as to the relation of necessary induction. Given a ﬁnite set of
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X , that is: X  g if and only if ⋂ f ∈X Ext f ⊆ Ext g .
Suppose now that g is a typical feature of f , so that we have g ∈ Int f . Then, by deﬁnition, every typical instance of f
must fall under g . Given an arbitrary exemplar x of f , we can consider that, by default, x falls under g since this property
holds for all typical exemplars of f . In this sense, g appears to be typically induced by f : for instance, the concept to-ﬂy
is typically induced by the concept to-be-a-bird, because, typically, birds ﬂy. We translate this dynamics by introducing the
inference relation ∼ between concepts, writing therefore f ∼ g any time we have g ∈ Int f . This relation will be called
the typical induction relation. Given an elementary concept f , we have therefore f ∼ g iff Typ f ⊆ Ext g or, equivalently, iff
Σ f  g .
It is clear that the relation ∼ is non-monotonic: if f is the concept to-be-a-bird, g the concept to-ﬂy and h the concept
to-be-an-ostrich, we have indeed f ∼ g but not (h  f ) ∼ g . However, relatively to the connective , the relation ∼ enjoys
several properties that are formally similar to those studied by Kraus et al. in their seminal paper [9] (see also [10] and [3]).
More precisely we have the following results:
Proposition 1. For all elementary concepts f , g and h
• if f  g, then f ∼ g (Supraclassicality),
• if f ≡ g and f ∼ h, then g ∼ h (Left Logical Equivalence),
• if f ∼ g and g  h, then f ∼ h (Right weakening),
• f ∼ g and f ∼ h if and only if f ∼ g  h (And),
• if f ∼ g and f ∼ h, then g  f ∼ h (Cautious Monotonicity).
Proof. The proof of the four ﬁrst properties is straightforward. For Cautious Monotonicity, suppose that f ∼ g and f ∼ h.
Let x be a ≺τg f -maximal element of Ext f ∩ Ext g . We have to prove that x falls under h. We claim that x ∈ Typ f : indeed,
if this were not the case, we would have x ≺τf z for any element z of Typ f (see Section 2.2). We would have therefore
x≺τg f z, contradicting the choice of x. This shows that x ∈ Typ f . Since we supposed that f ∼ h, we conclude that x ∈ Ext h,
as desired. 
In view of the above properties, we may think that typical induction behaves like a cumulative inference relation. How-
ever, this is not the case as there exists one important property of cumulative inference relations that is not satisﬁed by
typical induction. This rule, called Cut reads
if g  f ∼ h and f ∼ g, then f ∼ h.
Cut may be analyzed as a converse of Cautious Monotonicity. It is a derived rule in the system (P) of Kraus–Lehmann–
Magidor (see [9], Lemma 20). It turns out that Cut is not valid in the framework of typical induction, as can be seen from
the following example.
Example 1. Let f be the concept to-eat-seeds, g the concept to-be-a-bird, and h the concept to-ﬂy. Suppose that, for an
agent the characteristic set χ f associated with f consists of the singleton {g} = {to-be-a-bird}, so that, for this agent, typical
seed-eaters are birds. Suppose also that we have χg = {h} = {to-ﬂy}. Note that the set Typ f ∩ Typ g is not empty. As recalled
in Section 2.3, this implies that Typ(g  f ) = Typ f ∩ Typ g . Since Typ g is embedded in Ext h, we have Typ(g  f ) ⊆ Ext h,
showing that g  f ∼ h. We also noticed that f ∼ g . However, we cannot conclude that f ∼ h because not all birds ﬂy:
seed-eaters that are birds typically ﬂy, seed-eaters are typically birds, but seed-eaters do not typically ﬂy.
The fact that Cut is not satisﬁed by typical induction shows that the relation ∼ admits no model analogous to the KLM
cumulative models. In particular, there exists no possible representation of ∼ through order relations in O, as was the case
in KLM semantics. Of course, there exists a formal analogy since f ∼ g holds if and only if the ≺τf -maximal objects falling
under f also fall under g: however, the chosen order ≺τf is here a local one, and depends on the antecedent f of the rule
f ∼ g , which was not the case in the cumulative models of KLM.
In [10], Lehmann and Magidor advocated for a rule sharper than that of Cautious Monotonicity, which was ﬁrst pro-
posed in a personal communication by David Makinson. In the framework of propositional logic, this rule, called Rational
Monotony reads:
If α ∼ γ and not α ∼ ¬β, then α ∧ β ∼ γ .
As we shall see, a rule analogous to Rational Monotony holds for typical induction, provided we correctly interpret the
meaning that the inference α ∼ ¬β does not hold. Indeed, we are working in a poor language that is deprived of the usual
connectives, and in particular deprived of any form of negation. How are we then to understand the fact that, typically, a
concept f may or may not induce the ‘negation’ of an other concept g?
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under g . To say that, typically, f induces ‘not g ’ can be therefore interpreted by: all typical instances of f fall under ‘not’ g ,
that is Typ f ⊆ Ext(¬g). In the case where g is a sharp concept, this is equivalent to the property that no typical instance of
f falls under g: indeed, given a sharp concept g , the only interpretation one can give of the fact that an object falls under
‘not’ g is that this object does not fall under g . We have therefore in this case Typ f ⊆ Ext(¬g) ⇔ Typ f ∩ Ext g = ∅. For
instance, considering that to-ﬂy is a sharp concept, we consider as equivalent the propositions typically, mammals do not ﬂy
and no typical mammal ﬂies. However, when g is not sharp, this equivalence is no more valid and has to be replaced by the
simpler Typ f ⊆ Ext¬g ⇒ Typ f ∩ Ext g = ∅. In this case indeed there exist objects that partly fall under g and partly fall
under ¬g .2
It turns out that the condition ‘Typ f ∩ Ext g = ∅’ which is implied by the relation ‘ f ∼ ¬g ’, and equivalent to it when
g is sharp, corresponds to a property that was deﬁned and studied in [4]: the concepts g for which this equality holds are
exactly those which we deﬁned as exceptional for f (see Section 2.3 above).
In our framework, the rule that corresponds to this ‘cautious’ form of Rational Monotony consequently reads:
(CRM) If f ∼ h, and g is not exceptional for f , then g  f ∼ h.
This rule, for instance, will allow us to assert that typical black birds ﬂy, since we know the same is true for typical birds.
Proposition 2. The rule (CRM) holds for typical induction.
Proof. Since g is not exceptional for f , we have Typ(g  f ) ⊆ Typ f , as recalled in Section 2.3. By hypothesis, we know that
f typically induces h, so that Typ f ⊆ Ext h. It follows that Typ(g  f ) ⊆ Ext h. 
The introduction of the relations  and ∼ in the analysis of constructible concepts thus leads to an interesting analogy
with the theory of non-monotonic inference relations. It opens the possibility of treating in the framework of categorization
and prototype theory some problems classically linked with the notion of rationality. Among those, we may mention at
the ﬁrst place the theory of the revision of beliefs: translated in the language of concepts, this problem amounts to that of
withdrawing or adding information to the data constituted by the sets Δ f and χ f , or shifting information from one of these
sets to the other, a question that stands at the heart of the learning process. For instance, an agent may believe at a ﬁrst
stage that all birds ﬂy, and he will include to-ﬂy as an element of the deﬁning feature set of birds, until he comes to know
that this feature only applies to the subclass of typical birds.
It should be underlined, though, that most of the tools used in belief revision theory rest on the semantics of ratio-
nal relations, and on the possibility of representing these relations by means of modular orders deﬁned in the underlying
language or in the corresponding set of worlds. The absence of any similar representation theorem in the theory of con-
structible concepts shows that solutions is this domain will be more diﬃcult to reach.
4. On the inheritance of typical features
One of the most interesting problems in categorization theory concerns the inheritance of typical features. This problem
aims at determining which features considered as typical relatively to a concept f will remain typical relatively to a sub-
concept k of f . In its whole generality, this problem can be formalized as follows: given a subconcept k of f , which of the
properties induced by f remain induced by k?
It is clear that the solution is trivial if we consider necessary induction. Indeed, if k is a subconcept of f , we have k  f ,
and it follows that k  h for all concepts h such that f  h: features that are necessary consequences of f are a fortiori
necessary consequences of k. Thus, inheritance of necessary features fully holds. Concerning typical induction, however,
things are less simple, unless one considers smooth subconcepts of f , that is subconcepts k such that Typk ⊆ Typ f : for
these concepts indeed, it holds Int f ⊆ Int k, and we have therefore k ∼ h for every concept h such that f ∼ h. Thus, any
typical feature of f remains typical for k: inheritance fully holds for smooth subconcepts:
Proposition 3. Let k be a smooth subconcept of f . Then any typical feature of f remains typical for k. In particular this result holds for
all concepts k = g  f that are obtained through the determination of f by a non exceptional modiﬁer g.
Proof. Immediate. 
The above result may be seen as a theoretical justiﬁcation of the Default to the Stereotype theory, following which the
properties of a concept can be retrieved in any combination of this concept by a modiﬁer that do not exclude them. The
DS theory has been at the center of numerous experiments and discussions: see for instance [1,5,6] and [15]. It enables to
2 I am indebted to the anonymous referee who pointed out that the interpretation of Rational Monotony I proposed in a preliminary version was only
valid for sharp concepts.
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that a different (and in our sense erroneous) analysis of the DS theory is proposed in [1], where the authors back up their
discussion on examples with exceptional modiﬁers.
When k is not a smooth subconcept of f , Int f is no more a subset of Int k ([4], Proposition 12 and Theorem 1), and the
condition f ∼ h is not suﬃcient anymore to ensure that h is a typical feature of k. The inheritance problem restricted to
compound subconcepts k = g  f then becomes that of determining which typical properties of f remain preserved when
g is exceptional for f . We shall only propose a partial solution valid for the simplest cases.
Since k is not smooth in f , we have Typ f ∩ Ext g = ∅. Recalling (see Section 2.2) that Typ f = (⋂k∈χ f Ext k) ∩ Ext f , we
see that (
⋂
k∈χ f Ext k) ∩ Ext f ∩ Ext g = ∅. This latter condition occurs in particular when, in the context f , the concept g
directly contradicts a given element k0 of χ f , that is when Ext f ∩ Ext g ∩ Ext k0 = ∅. As we shall see, in this case, and
provided k0 is sharp, all f -typical features that are ‘independent’ of k0 remain typical for g  f :
Proposition 4. Suppose that there exists a sharp concept k0 in χ f such that Ext f ∩ Ext g ∩ Ext k0 = ∅, while (⋂k∈χ f ,k 
=k0 Ext k) ∩
Ext f ∩ Ext g 
= ∅. Then g  f ∼ h for all typical features h of f such that (χ f \ {k0})  h.
Proof. We ﬁrst prove that g  f ∼ h for any element h of χ f , k 
= k0. Let x be an element of Typ(g  f ); x is therefore
≺τg f -maximal in Ext g ∩ Ext f . Suppose by reductio ad absurdum that x does not fall under h. Let z be an element of
(
⋂
k∈χ f ,k 
=k0 Ext k) ∩ Ext f ∩ Ext g: such an element exists by hypothesis. We have then ϕk(x)k ϕk(z) for all k ∈ χ f , k 
= k0,
ϕh(x) <h ϕh(z) and ϕk0(x) = 0 because k0 is a sharp concept that does not apply to x. This shows that we have x ≺τf z,
hence x≺τg f z, thus contradicting the choice of x.
We have therefore proven that g  f ∼ h for all elements h of χ f , k 
= k0. Let now h be an element of Int f such that
(χ f \ {k0})  h. By what precedes, we have Typ(g  f ) ⊆⋂k∈χ f ,k 
=k0 Ext k. But this latter set is now a subset of Ext h, and we
have therefore Typ(g  f ) ⊆ Ext h, which completes the proof of the proposition. 
Example 2. Let f be the concept to-be-a-bird, and suppose that χ f consists of the supposedly sharp features to-ﬂy, to-build-
nests, to-sing and to-eat-seeds. The above proposition then shows that, typically, walking-birds sing, walking-birds build nests
and walking-birds eat seeds. Walking birds however do not inherit the property of ﬂying, as this latter is contradicted by the
concept to-walk.
It is worth noticing that Proposition 4 can be easily generalized to the case where there exist several sharp characteristic
features k0,k1, . . . ,kn such that Ext f ∩Ext g∩Ext ki = ∅, provided the set (⋂k∈χ f ,k 
=k0,k 
=k1,...,k 
=kn Ext k)∩Ext f ∩Ext g remains
not empty.
5. Category-based induction
Category-based induction is the process through which, from a given category (or from a given set of categories), we
infer information relative to another category, this inference being based on a taxonomic link between the source and
the target category. For instance, we may infer to a whole category a property that is known to hold for some typical
subcategory, like in the example: setters are susceptible to dysplasia, therefore all dogs are susceptible to dysplasia. We may also
rest our judgement on a similarity between the source and the target category: knowing that cows eat grass, we may deduce
that horses eat grass as well because we consider that cows and horses are somewhat similar, being both farm-animals and
having comparative sizes. A third process consists in inferring to a whole category a property that is known to hold for two
distant subcategories that provide together a good coverage of the target category: thus, knowing that rottweilers and bassets
are susceptible to a certain disease, one may conclude that all dogs are susceptible to this disease. Much research has been
devoted to the phenomena of category-based induction and several models have been proposed, the most known of which
are the Similarity Coverage Model [12] and the Feature-Based Induction Model [14]. The interested reader may consult [7]
or Chapter 8 of [11] for a detailed review. We shall successively examine induction through typicality and induction through
resemblance, using the model and the tools developed in the preceding sections: ﬁrst, in Sections 5.1 and 5.2, we shall
deal with typical subcategories, and try to determine which of their properties can be raised to the mother category. Then, in
Section 5.3, we shall consider induction through similarity and examine the possible extension of a property from a category
to a neighboring category. The problem of induction through covering subcategories will not be treated at this stage and
only brieﬂy evoked in the conclusion.
5.1. Global category-based induction
Let us ﬁrst consider the global problem of raising to a whole category properties that are known to hold for a subcategory.
This problem can be seen as a converse of that of attribute inheritance, which we addressed in the previous section.
In order to examine whether such an extension is possible, we have to make a distinction between the different types of
properties we are looking for. Indeed, if we restrict our attention to necessary properties, the global category-based induction
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this amounts to characterizing the subconcepts k of f for which Essk ⊆ Ess f . But this embedding is itself equivalent to
Ext f ⊆ Ext k, and we ﬁnally ﬁnd that the problem trivially boils down to the research of the subconcepts k of f such that
Ext f = Ext k. This remark drives us to formalize the global based-induction problem in a more general form, focusing our
research on the subconcepts k of f that satisfy the following k-based induction property:
∀h (k  h ⇒ f ∼ h).
This condition amounts to requiring that a feature that applies to all instances of k typically extends to f . Note that a
necessary condition for k to satisfy this property is that f ∼k, that is k ∈ Int f . In fact, it turns out that this condition is also
a suﬃcient one: indeed, if f ∼ k holds, we know by Right Weakening that one has f ∼ h for all concepts h such that k  h:
Proposition 5. Global k-based induction holds if and only if k is a subcategory of f that satisﬁes f ∼ k.
Proof. Clear. 
As a particular case, it is interesting to characterize the determinations k of f for which global induction holds:
Corollary 1. Global k-based induction holds for a compound concept k = g  f if and only if f ∼ g.
Proof. If f ∼ g , we have f ∼ g  f by And, and the result follows. Conversely, suppose that k-based induction holds for
k = g  f . We have then k  g , and therefore f ∼ g as claimed. 
The above result guarantees that necessary attributes of g  f can be typically extended to f , provided g is a typical
attribute of f . Knowing for instance that all ﬂying birds have feathers with remix, we can induce that, typically, birds have
feathers with remix.
5.2. Induction through typical subcategories
When k is a subconcept of f that is not typically induced by f , global induction does not hold anymore. It is nevertheless
interesting, at least in the case where k is considered as suﬃciently representing f , to determine which necessary features
of k will typically extend to f . The typicality-based induction problem that we have therefore to examine becomes that of
characterizing the properties of a ‘typical’ subcategory that may extend to the whole category: for instance, given the fact
that all robins are susceptible of disease X, this will enable us to conclude that, typically, birds in general are susceptible of
disease X, that is, all typical birds are susceptible of disease X.
We have to be aware, though, that this kind of inference cannot be drawn for any arbitrary property of k: thus, the fact
that robins have reddish-orange chest feathers cannot be generalized to arbitrary birds, not even to typical ones. Indeed,
among the bird family, this particular feature is speciﬁc to robins: it nearly characterizes the subcategory they form, and,
consequently, it is hopeless to try and generalize it to a supercategory. It is interesting to note that the distinction between
speciﬁc and non-speciﬁc features has been explicitly evoked in the seminal papers on category-based induction ([12] or [14]),
where the authors took care of circumscribing their tests to features h that would appear as abstract ‘blank’ predicates to
the participants, not being related in to any previous knowledge they could have on f or k. We shall consider this problem
and propose a deﬁnition of k-speciﬁcity. However, we ﬁrst need to precisely deﬁne the notion of a typical subcategory.
5.2.1. Typical subconcepts
Let us again consider the concept f = to-be-a-bird. When an agent says that the robin is a typical exemplar of this
concept, he rests his assertion on the fact that robins inherit all the attributes that a typical bird should have: to ﬂy, to
sing, to live in the trees and so on. This inheritance property then extends from individual items to the whole category of
robins, thus becoming a feature of the concept to-be-a-robin. For such a subconcept k, we have therefore Ext k ⊆ Typ f , or,
equivalently, χ f ⊆ Essk: the characteristic features of f become necessary features for k.
However, we observe that the embedding χ f ⊆ Essk is not suﬃcient by itself to guarantee induction to the target
supercategory. For instance, dogs form a typical subcategory of animals, but knowing that dogs are susceptible of disease X
will not be suﬃcient to infer that animals are susceptible of disease X : dogs cannot be considered as representing the category
of animals the same way robins represent the category of birds. No track of the stereotypical features of to-be-an-animal
can be retrieved in the stereotypical set associated with the concept to-be-a-dog. On the contrary, an agent considering that
the concept to-be-a-robin is a typical subconcept of to-be-a-bird will be very likely to consider the characteristic features of
to-be-a-bird as deﬁning features of to-be-a-robin. Thus, stereotypical properties of birds will become deﬁning properties of
robins: for instance, a robin may be presented as ‘an (ordinary) bird that lives in North America and has red-orange chest feathers’.
This implicitly amounts to considering that the characteristic features of to-be-a-bird are part of the deﬁning features of to-
be-a-robin, and that, for the considered concepts, one has χ f ⊆ Δk . It is this very property that one usually translates by a
sentence of the type ‘The robin is a typical bird’.
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deﬁning feature set f together with its characteristic set, that is if Δk satisﬁes Δk ⊇ { f } ∪ χ f .
For an f -typical subconcept k, the characteristic features of f therefore become necessary features for k; it follows that
k  h whenever f ∼ h implies so that Int f ⊆ Essk. Note that typical subconcepts are necessarily smooth in f , as they satisfy
Typk ⊆ Ext k ⊆ Typ f .
5.2.2. Speciﬁc and non-speciﬁc features
It is clear that the only features one can infer from a typical subcategory are those that are not considered as speciﬁc
to this subcategory. As we mentioned, the experiments conducted on category-based induction focused on abstract blank
predicates. For the participants, these predicates did not bear any special meaning, they were liable to apply to any category
that was considered close enough to the tested one. On the contrary, features that were tightly related or speciﬁc to the
source category had to be discarded. In order to capture this distinction, we have to introduce a new notion.
Proposition 6. Let k be a subconcept of a concept f , with associated width Nμk , membership distance function μk and membership
degree function δμk . Let h be an arbitrary concept, μh and δ
μ
h its corresponding membership distance and degree. Then the following
conditions are equivalent:
(1) ∀x ∈ Ext f , ∀ > 0, ∃η 1/Nμk : δμk (x) 1− η ⇒ δμh (x) > 1−  .
(2) ∀x ∈ Ext f , ∀b  1,∃a 1: μk(x) a ⇒ μh(x) < b.
(2) ∀x ∈ Ext f , μk(x) 1⇒ μh(x) = 0.
Proof. As recalled in Section 2, the relation between the width Nμk of k and its membership degree δ
μ
k is given by N
μ
k =
|δμk (O)| − 1. The equivalence between (1) and (2) then results from the equality δμk = 1−μk/Nμk . The equivalence between
(2) and (3) is immediate. 
The conditions of Proposition 6 mean that any item that is close to falling under k will fall under h. In this sense, h
realizes a good approximation of k. In particular, we have Ext k ⊆ Ext h, as readily follows from (3).
Deﬁnition 4. The concept h is said to be a non-speciﬁc feature of k in f if it satisﬁes one of the above equivalences.
Thus, h is a non-speciﬁc feature of k in f if it applies to all exemplars of k and also to all instances of f that are close
of falling under k. For instance, to-have-webbed-feet, in the category of birds, may be seen as a non-speciﬁc feature of ducks,
as it is shared by all aquatic birds. Note that the condition of non-speciﬁcity is irreﬂexive, as we cannot have h = k in (3):
a non-speciﬁc feature of k may apply to exemplars of f that do not fall under k.
Remark 1. In category-based induction, the subconcepts k one is generally interested in are vague concepts. In the limit case
where k is sharp, the non-speciﬁc associated concepts h are exactly those that apply to Ext f .
Example 3. Suppose that k is a typical subconcept of f , and that its deﬁning feature set consists of the three sharp concepts
f , r and s, with empty salience order. Let h be a sharp concept that applies to any exemplar of f falling either under r or
under s. Let us show that h is not speciﬁc for k. Note that the exemplars of f may be sorted in four classes, x1, x2, x3 and
x4, depending of their respective membership relatively to r and s:
f r s
x1 1 0 0
x2 1 0 1
x3 1 1 0
x4 1 1 1
The corresponding k-membership order boils down to x1 ≺μk x2 ≺μk x4 and x1 ≺μk x3 ≺μk x4, and it follows that the mem-
bership distances are given by the array:
μk μh μr μs
x1 2 0 or 1 1 1
x2 1 0 1 0
x3 1 0 0 1
x4 0 0 0 0
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as results from the array, this property does not hold for r or s, although both of these concepts extend k.
We now come back to the problem of induction based on typical subcategories, which we circumscribe in the following
form: given a typical subconcept k of f , determine the features that can be raised from k to f .
The following result shows that, in the simplest cases, any non-speciﬁc feature will do the job:
Proposition 7. Let k be a typical subconcept of f . Suppose its deﬁning feature set Δk has empty salience order, and that it is of the
form Δk = { f ,u} ∪ χ f , where u is a sharp concept. Then any non-speciﬁc feature of k typically extends to f .
Proof. The proposition asserts that k-based induction holds for every non-speciﬁc feature of k, so that we have f ∼ h for
every concept h that is non-speciﬁc for k. Let x be an element of Typ f . Then x falls under all the elements of χ f . Since x
also falls under f , the hypotheses show that its membership distance to Ext k is 0 or 1, depending whether or not x falls
under u. We have therefore μk(x) 1, and the hypothesis on h then implies μh(x) = 0, showing that h applies to x. 
Theoretically, the deﬁning feature set of a typical subconcept k of f may be of the form Δk = { f ,u1,u2, . . . ,un} ∪ χ f ,
with arbitrary vague concepts u1,u2, . . . ,un . It is clear that greater is the number n of intermediate concepts, smaller is the
number of features that will extend from k to f . However, most often, typical subconcepts of f are obtained by adding to
χ f a small number of extra sharp features, which rarely exceeds 2: for instance, a dictionary will deﬁne a robin as ‘a North-
American bird with dull-red breast’; similarly, a setter will be ‘a long-haired dog trained to ﬁnd game’, and an apartment is
deﬁned as ‘a residence in a larger building’. . . . The k-membership distance of any typical instance of f thus appears to be
generally bounded by an integer  2. An arbitrary non-speciﬁc feature h of k is therefore very likely to be typically induced
by f .
The (partial) answer that Proposition 7 gives to the typicality-based induction problem supposes that the salience order
on Δk is empty. It is interesting also to consider the case of a non-trivial order. The most common example occurs when the
elements of χ f are given highest salience in Δk . Indeed this situation most frequently arises in the situations where k ‘best
represents’ f . For instance, considering, as we currently do, that the robin adequately represents the concept to-be-a-bird
shows that we give greater salience to its being a small ﬂying-bird than to the color of its chest-feathers. Thus, in the above
proposition, we may focus our attention on the special case where the feature u is less salient than any of the characteristic
features of f . In this case, Proposition 7 provides a necessary and suﬃcient condition:
Proposition 8. Let k be a typical subconcept of f with Δk = { f ,u} ∪ χ f . Suppose a salience order >k is set on Δk such that g >k u
for all elements g of f ∪ χ f . Then a necessary feature of k typically extends to f if and only if it is not speciﬁc for k.
Proof. If x is a typical exemplar of f , the hypotheses show that the membership distance of x to Ext k is 0 or 1 depending
whether or not x falls under u, and we conclude as in Proposition 7. Conversely, suppose that k-based induction holds for
a concept h, so that we have k  h and f ∼ h; let us prove that h is non-speciﬁc for k. If x is an instance of f such that
μk(x) = 1, we have to show that μh(x) = 0. Observe that x cannot fall under u. Indeed, if this were the case, the equality
μk(x) = 1 would imply the existence of an element g of χ f that would not apply to x. Consider now a typical instance y
of f that does not fall under u (if Typ f = Δk , the proposition is trivially true). Since g is more salient than u, we would
have x ≺μk y. But we have y ≺μk z for any exemplar z of k, and this would yield μk(x) > 1, contradicting the choice of x.
This shows that x indeed cannot fall under u. Since we have μk(x) = 1, we see now that x necessarily falls under all the
elements of { f } ∪ χ f : otherwise, choosing a typical instance y of f that does not fall under u would again yield x ≺μk y,
and therefore μk(x) < 1. This shows that we have x ∈ Typ f . The hypothesis f ∼ h then implies that x falls under h, and we
have therefore proven that μh(x) = 0 whenever μk(x) 1, so that h is a non-speciﬁc feature of k. 
5.3. Similarity-based induction
The last problem we are now going to deal with is that of similarity-based induction. Similarity-based induction is the
process by which we project knowledge concerning a given class of items to another class that we judge similar to the
ﬁrst one. For example, given that hen are susceptible to coccidia, we may conclude without any additional information that
ducks are susceptible to coccidia; similarly, knowing that cows eat grass, we may infer that horses eat grass as well. In this type
of induction, similarity inside a given category f (that of animals, for instance) allows a default reasoning: what holds for
a particular subcategory k of f will generally hold for another subcategory l of f provided the instances of l suﬃciently
resemble those of k.
In a ﬁrst approach, the problem of similarity-based induction seems to be linked with the problems treated in the
preceding sections: in some cases, it can indeed be analyzed through a double operation of ascendant and descendant
induction: inducing a feature h from k to a ‘neighboring’ category l is often performed (be it explicitly or not) through a
k-basis induction to the smallest category f that encompasses k and l, followed by a simple inheritance induction from f
to its subcategory l. This particular process can be therefore captured by the following
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hypotheses of Proposition 7 or 8. Then every non-speciﬁc feature of k in f extends to l.
Proof. Let h be a non-speciﬁc feature of k in f . We want to prove that l ∼ h. We have ﬁrst Typ f ⊆ Ext h by Proposition 7;
next, the hypothesis on l implies that Typ l ⊆ Typ f . It then follows that Typ l ⊆ Ext h, showing that h is a typical feature
of l. 
In the above proposition, the similarity between the source category k and the target category l is captured by the fact
that k and l share many features in common: among them, in particular, we ﬁnd all the typical features of f , since we have
Int f ⊆ Int k ∩ Int l.
Example 4. Consider again the hen and ducks example: we take for f the concept to-be-a-barnyard-bird, and for k and l
the subconcepts to-be-a-hen and to-be-a-duck. We can suppose, for instance, that the deﬁning feature set associated with k
consists of the concept f and its characteristic features together with the concept u = to-be-a-seed-eater (or to-provide-eggs).
Then, the hypotheses of Proposition 9 are satisﬁed: k is a typical subconcept of f and l is a smooth subconcept of f . The
proposition ensures that any non-speciﬁc feature that applies to hen will also apply to ducks. This enables us to conclude
that ducks are susceptible to coccidia if such is the case for hen.
It worth noting that the validity domain of Proposition 9 is restricted to a speciﬁc kind of similarity induction in which
the source k and the target l are maximally embedded in a common super concept f . Such will not be the case in examples
like that of cows and horses discussed at the beginning of this section, where similarity is based on common features (shape,
size, way of living) rather than on a common genealogy. For the treatment of these examples, direct resemblance has to be
taken into account, and it therefore appears necessary to ﬁrst deﬁne and circumscribe this notion.
5.3.1. On resemblance
Like typicality and membership, the notion of resemblance is a fundamental one in the categorization process. It has
been therefore at the center of numerous theoretical and experimental studies, which either aimed at precisely deﬁning
this notion by proposing a way of evaluating the resemblance degree between two items—see for instance [16]—or tried to
determine the link between resemblance, membership and typicality (see [13] or [17]). From our point of view, and in the
framework of constructible concepts, resemblance may be analyzed and treated through a preorder relation in a way quite
similar to what was done for membership and typicality.
To a ﬁrst approximation, the notion of resemblance may appear as directly linked with that of membership: saying
that the bat resembles a bird means that bats are close of falling under the concept to-be-a-bird. However, it is clear that
resemblance relative to a concept is usually perceived as resemblance with the typical instances of this concept. When we
say that such particular animal x resembles a bird, we mean in fact two different things: ﬁrst that x is not known at the
present moment to be an instance of the concept to-be-a-bird, and, secondly that x resembles a typical bird, sharing with
this concept a certain amount of characteristic features: for instance, even though a child may argue that a seal resembles a
penguin, he will never adventure to say that the seal resembles a bird. Similarly, when we say that such animal y does not
resemble a bird, we mean that y does not resemble a typical bird, even if we know that y is a bird: thus, an assertion like
‘the penguin does not resemble a bird’ is perfectly understandable. Resemblance has therefore to deal with the characteristic
features of a concept as well as with its deﬁning features.
We shall be ﬁrstly interested in resemblance between objects and concepts, trying to formalize notions encapsulated in
expressions like this building resembles a church or Toby resembles a wolf. More precisely, our aim is to deﬁne a resemblance
order among the objects at hand that will accurately translate the notion that object x resembles more an f than object y.
In view of the preceding remark, this order will rest on the stereotypical set Σ f associated with f . We recall that, for
vague concepts, this set was deﬁned as the union of the deﬁning and the characteristic feature sets: Σ f
def= Δ f ∪ χ f . In the
particular case where f is a sharp concept (for which Δ f is not deﬁned), we may replace the set Δ f in the above writing
by a set that includes the concept f itself together with some of its most relevant necessary features—those at least that, in
the agent’s mind, are useful to the comprehension of the concept. From the perspective of an agent, the set Σ f then fully
characterizes the concept f , helping deﬁning it and differentiating it from neighboring concepts. This notion of stereotypical
feature stems from current work in cognitive psychology, where it is used together with those of prototype and stereotype
with a meaning that conforms with our deﬁnition (see for instance [1], [2], or [8]).
For simplicity, we shall suppose that, for vague concepts, the stereotypical set inherits its salience order from its (disjoint)
subsets χ f and Δ f , and consider that deﬁning features are incomparable to characteristic ones. However, the following
remains valid whatever order the agent considers suitable for Σ f . We shall say that Σk is ﬂat if it has no salience order.
We deﬁne the resemblance (pre)order associated with f as follows:
Deﬁnition 5. Let f be an elementary concept with associated stereotypical feature set Σ f . The resemblance (pre)order ρf
on O is deﬁned by x ρf y if, for any concept h of Σ f such that ϕh(y) <h ϕh(x), there exists a concept k of Σ f , k more
salient than h, such that ϕk(x) <k ϕk(y).
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Proof. The proof is similar to those showing that the membership and the typicality orderings were indeed preorders. The
interested reader may look at [4], Lemma 1. 
The ≺ρf -maximal elements are exactly those that are f -typical. When restricted to Ext f , the resemblance order agrees
with the typicality order: thus, we consider that an ostrich ‘resembles’ more a bird than a penguin because it is more typical
as a bird than the penguin. Conversely, we may consider that an ostrich is a more typical bird than the penguin because it
resembles more a (‘real’) bird than the penguin. Note that this deﬁnition of resemblance leads to cases where an object x
falling under f may resemble less an instance of f than an object y that does not fall under f : for instance, the penguin
may be thought as resembling less a bird than the bat . . . .
As was done for membership and typicality, it is possible to introduce a degree of f -resemblance, δρf , based on the
resemblance order ρf . For this, we ﬁrst deﬁne the resemblance distance ρ f (x) separating an object x from the set Typ f as





f is the length of the longest existing f -resemblance chain. This construction provides a numerical function
with value in a ﬁnite subset of [0,1]. Note that the resemblance degree of an object is 1 if and only if its resemblance
distance is 0, hence if and only if this object is f -typical.
This deﬁnition of resemblance puts a new light on the classical problem concerning the link, if any, between resemblance
and membership. It has been observed indeed that categorization often proceeds through similarity to the prototype: we
decide that an item x falls under a concept f once we note it ‘suﬃciently resembles’ a typical instance of f . Taking into
account our deﬁnition of resemblance, this amounts to saying that an object becomes an exemplar of f whenever it falls
under a ‘signiﬁcative’ number of f -stereotypical features. Such is indeed the case when the partial conjunction of some
elements of χ f with some elements of Δ f is enough to ensure f -membership:
Example 5. Let f be the concept to-be-a-bird, and suppose that from the point of view of an agent, its associated stereo-
typical set consists of the sharp features to-have-feathers, to-ﬂy, to-have-wings and to-build-nests. Suppose also as part of
the agent’s knowledge that only birds fall under the conjunction of three of these properties. Then any item x showing
an f -resemblance degree greater than 1/2 will necessarily fall under f : above this threshold, bird-resemblance implies
bird-membership.
Resemblance between objects can now be used to deﬁne resemblance between concepts, making use of the resemblance
distance function: given two concepts k and l, we can indeed deﬁne the (asymmetric) resemblance distance from l to k,
written ρk(l), as the greatest of the numbers ρk(x), x ∈ Typ l. The smaller is this number, the more l resembles to k. We have
ρk(l) = 0 if and only if Typ l ⊆ Typk, that is if and only if l is a smooth subconcept of k.
5.3.2. Induction through resemblance
It is now possible to reexamine the problem of induction by similarity through the formalization of the notion of resem-
blance which we proposed in the preceding paragraph. The problem, we recall, consists in determining which properties of
a category k may be transposed to a category l that appears to be suﬃciently close to k. We shall examine only the simplest
case where the source and the target category have maximal resemblance. In view of the examples evoked above, we are
interested in the cases where the categories covered by k and l are disjoint: thus, we look for properties that transpose from
birds to bats, from ducks to hen or from cows to horses. By abuse of language, we shall say that two concepts k and l are
disjoint if such is the case for the corresponding categories, that is if Ext k ∩ Ext l = ∅. The following proposition shows that,
under a technical assumption on the structure of Σk , transposition from k to l fully holds when l is a concept disjoint from
k and maximally resemblant to k.
Proposition 11. Let k be a concept with ﬂat associated stereotypical set Σk. Suppose that for any proper subset X of Σk, there exists
an object z that falls under every concept of X and no concept of Σk \ X. Let l be a concept disjoint from k, with resemblance distance
to k equal to 1. Then any typical feature of k remains typical for l.
By this result, if l is a concept suﬃciently close to k, then l ∼ h for every concept h such that k ∼ h.
Proof. Let h be a typical feature of k, and x an element of Typ l. We have to prove that h applies to x. By the hypotheses,
we have ρk(x) = 1, and an inequality of the form x ≺ρk z is therefore possible only if z falls under all the elements Σk , that
is if z is an element of Typk. Note that x falls under all the concepts of Σk but one: let f be this latter concept. We claim
that f ∈ Δk: since k and l are disjoint, we know indeed already that there exists a concept g of Δk that does not apply to x.
If f and g were distinct, the hypothesis on Σk would imply the existence of an element z falling under f and under all the
elements of Δk but g: we would then have x ≺ρk z, z /∈ Typk, a contradiction. This shows that x falls under all the elements
of χk . Since h a typical feature of k, we have χk  h, and we see therefore that x falls under h, as desired. 
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The analysis of constructible concepts through their associated feature sets provided the basic tools necessary to inves-
tigate and formalize notions like typicality, membership, and resemblance. The re-interpretation of these concepts in the
perspective of non-monotonic logics revealed itself to be particularly interesting, leading to some fruitful results in the
problem of downward and upward induction. In particular, it showed some possible ways of formalizing and answering
questions which, up to now, were merely evoked as a mystery of the cognitive process. Thus, at least in some simple cases,
we could provide a solution to the problems of category induction based on inheritance, typicality and, at an elementary
level, resemblance. These solutions, although partial ones, have however the interest of showing that the technics developed
in the study of constructible concepts are suitable to solve some classical problems of cognitive psychology. At the same
time, we have to mention that, these technics do not seem suﬃcient to treat all the forms of category-based induction. For
instance, they seem to be ineffective in the problem of induction through diversity phenomenon, a problem we had to leave
aside at this stage. In this type of induction, indeed, a feature h that applies to two categories k and l is likely to apply
to a common supercategory f , provided k and l are suﬃciently distant one another in f . The non-speciﬁcity of h is not
suﬃcient then to guarantee an extension to f , and we do not retrieve conditions similar to that of Proposition 7. Induction
based on diversity stems from the fact that the smaller is the category f , the best is the coverage realized by k and l in f ,
so that any property valid for k and l is likely to be valid for the whole category: swans and ducks do not properly cover the
category of birds, but they cover well enough the subcategory of waterfowl, which can be seen as the smallest subcategory
that encompasses swans and ducks: thus, any property satisﬁed by ducks and swans is likely to apply to any aquatic bird.
Altogether, we may consider that k and l realize a good coverage of f if every object falling under f is close to falling either
under k or under l. The problem is that any rigorous deﬁnition of these notions is criticizable. For this reason, it seems that,
in its whole generality, the diversity based-induction problem cannot be treated without a signiﬁcant deepening of the basic
notions developed in this paper.
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